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KLM v. TULLER: A NEW APPROACH TO ADMINISSIBILITY OF PRIOR STATEMENTS
OF A WITNESS
David Dow*
Within the past few years there have been a number of important cases decided by federal courts involving difficult points of
evidende law, and suggesting a trend toward liberality in admission of evidence.' On the face of the opinions many of these decisions are influenced by the clear direction of the Federal Rules
of Procedure, both civil 2 and criminal. 3 Some are also obviously

influenced by the discussion and study engendered by the Model
Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 4 These
decisions show a strong desire to re-examine the old rules of exclusion. Courts today are consistently faced with the question
of whether the reasons thought to support those rules still apply
today in view of modern procedural devices such as discovery,
*
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See, e.g., Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958) (admitting
statements of an agent which were clearly not res gestae); Shahid v.
Gulf Power Co., 291 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1961) (similar facts); Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Ferrara, 277 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1960) (admitting the
criminal conviction for arson in civil action against insurance company
and holding it conclusive); Aluminum Co. of America v. Sperry Prods.
Co., 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960) (admitting prior letter of witness and
relying on it for decision because it was relevant); Campbell v. Clark,
283 F.2d 766 (10th Cir. 1960) (expert evidence on point and angle of
impact in auto accident case admitted as a matter of general evidence
law); Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.
1961) (opinion admitted as to whom defendant referred to in alleged
libelous publication because federal equity court probably would have
admitted it); Hambrice v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 290 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.
1961) (habit evidence admitted as a matter of general evidence law);
United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1961) (state of mind
and co-conspirator's admissions exceptions to hearsay rule given liberal interpretation).

2

FED.

3

FED. R. Caim. P. 26.
UNIFORM RULEs OF EVIDENCE, approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association, has not yet been adopted by any state, but they are being
carefully studied in a number of states and recommendations for adoption are imminent in Utah and New Jersey.

4

R. Civ. P. 43(a).
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which can and usually do take much of the element of surprise
out of trials. The trend for liberality by the courts may be influenced by the feeling that juries are better educated today than
they were 100 years ago when many of the evidence rules were
being evolved, and that lawyers are better prepared to use the
adversary system of litigation. Both of these considerations suggest that much relevant evidence could be admitted in modern
trials without running the danger of its being erroneously evaluated by a jury.
One of the most interesting of these cases, because it raises a
problem which involves a rather complicated analysis and at the
same time one which is constantly recurring, is KLM v. Tuller.
The litigation arose from the crash of one of defendant KLM's
airplanes in shallow water shortly after taking off from Shannon
Airport in Ireland. Tuller, a passenger, through a series of misfortunes was left on the tail of the airplane for more than four
hours. He slipped and drowned just as help was finally coming.
His widow sued in the District Court of Columbia, and the principal issue, on appeal, was the plaintiff's claim that the $8,300 limitation on recovery for death contained in the Warsaw Convention did not apply,6 because defendant's agents were guilty of
"wilful misconduct." It is pertinent to the consideration of the
evidence problem to note that the court construed "wilful misconduct" to include the intentional performance of an act (or
failure to act) with knowledge that the act will probably result
in injury or damage, or in some manner as to 7imply reckless disregard of the consequences of its performance.
Among the acts which plaintiff claimed showed wilful misconduct was that the radio operator failed to send a distress message
before or after the crash although he could have. The radio operator
gave a deposition which was offered into evidence by plaintiff
in which he first testified that he did not send a distress message
before the plane crashed because he did not have time to do so.
He then testified that he had given a statement to the Inspector of
Airports at the Shannon Airport about twelve hours after the
5 Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N. V. v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C.
Cir. 1961.)
6 Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention provides: "(1.) The carrier shall
not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention

which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his
wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with

the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be
equivalent to wilful misconduct." Warsaw Convention, 49 Stat. 3020
7

(1934).
292 F.2d at 779.
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accident at which various persons were present including one of
defendant's chief flight engineers. A transcript of this statement
was then offered by plaintiff and objected to by defendant as
hearsay.8 The trial court received this statement as substantive
evidence, and this was claimed as error on appeal. In the statement the radio operator stated that he did not think, when the
crash occurred, to pick up the microphone in front of him and
report that there was something wrong. "I could tell you that
would never happen. You first think of your skin, and then of
the microphone. That was my feeling, because it happened so
fast."9
Traditionally, a prior statement of a witness may be used by
proponent's counsel in one of the following ways:
(a) To jog the witness's memory, and thereby seek to get
him to change his trial testimony or add to it. Mrs. Tuller's counsel apparently made no effort to do this.
(b) To impeach the witness. The great majority of jurisdictions do not permit this unless the proponent is both damaged
and surprised by the trial testimony. 10 And even if permitted,
the prior statement cannot be given substantive effect unless the
witness does change his mind at trial." A few states by statute
permit one to impeach his own witness, but the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 43 (b), only permit this if the witness is
the adverse party or an officer, director or managing agent of the2
adverse party-which the radio operator obviously was not.'
Mrs. Tuller's counsel did not seek to use the statement in this way
as he wanted it for its substantive effect.
(c) To prove the proposition asserted, arguing that it is not
hearsay because it was not offered to prove the fact directly asserted in the statement. 13
(d) To prove the proposition asserted, arguing that it comes
under one of the accepted exceptions to the hearsay rule.
(e) To prove the proposition asserted, arguing that the prior
statement of a witness on the stand is not hearsay because the
8 It does not clearly appear from the opinion, but apparently the statement was identified by the radio operator at the time of his deposition
and offered in evidence when the deposition was read at the trial. Letter from M. S. Madden, counsel for the plaintiff, to author, Dec. 12,
1961.
9 292 F.2d at 782-83.
10 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 38 (1954).
11 Id. § 39.
12 Johnson v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 208 F.2d 633 (3rd Cir. 1953).
13 McComvixcx, EVIDENCE § 228 (1954).
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witness is now available for cross-examination and because it is
the witness's own statement and not that of some third person.
Whether this be called hearsay or something else with all the
same incidents is a matter of definition only. Although appealing
failed to adopt this dison its face, courts have almost always
14
tinction for either reason suggested.
I will analyze briefly the arguments for admissibility of the
radio operator's statement, under (c) and (d) above, and the
court's decision which affirmed the trial court's admission of the
statement on the ground that the statement had "the earmarks of
reliability."' 5 The opinion appears to be carefully written to avoid
classifying the holding under any of the standard exclusions from
or exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The most obvious ground of admissibility involves the case in
which the witness happens to be the opposing party. Whether
this is properly classified as not hearsay or as an exception to the
hearsay rule has been much debated, but to little practical effect. 16 Certainly the radio operator's statement does not come
within this rule, because he was not the opposing party.
The next obvious ground of admissibility involves the case
in which the opposing party has somehow adopted a third person's
statement after it was made. This was the alternative ground
used in Pekelis v. TWA, 17 where the defendant airline company
14

United States v. Rainwater, 283 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1960).

A careful

collection of the authorities. But see Judge Lumbard's careful attempt
in United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1962), to revive the
opposite view previously expressed by that court in DiCarlo v. United
States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925). In Murray the government was permitted to introduce a prior inconsistent statement of its own witness.
The Court of Appeals affirmed saying: "The fact that the statement
was used to cast doubt upon Miss Smith's negative testimony, and thus
to build the government's case rather than merely to tear down testimony actually harmful to it, does not make it any less admissible." 297
F.2d at 816-17. [DiCarlo is then cited and quoted and United States v.
Block, 88 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1937) distinguished.] Judge Lumbard continued: "Rather, here the presentation was giving the jury an opportunity to determine the truth of Miss Smith's negative response to a
single question by noting her prior inconsistent answer and observing
her attempt to reconcile her previous statement with what she now
claimed to be the truth. Thus the jury was to draw its conclusion not
from the out-of-court statement, but rather from the witness' in-court
conduct when confronted with it. So considered, the statement was
not hearsay."
15

292 F.2d at 784-85.

16 See Hetland, Admissions in the Uniform Rules: Are They Necessary?,
46 IowA L. REV. 307, 308-09 (1961).
17 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951).
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accepted the report and recommendations of its investigating
board and put the recommendations into effect. The statement
of the third party then became by adoption the defendant's own
statement. In Tuller, KLM could hardly have adopted the radio
operator's statement, unless its chief flight engineer's failure to
challenge the statement at the time it was made could be so construed. Silence may, of course, be so construed, but usually only
if made under such circumstances that a reasonable man would
have been expected to challenge it if he thought or knew it to be
false.'
There are several pitfalls in using this argument in the
Tuller case. There were no facts to show that the chief flight
engineer had the opportunity to challenge it if he had wanted to,
he had no basis to know or believe one way or the other, and his
authority to act for or bind KLM was not shown.
Such a statement may also be analyzed as the statement of
an agent or servant of the opposing party, and the opinion in Tuller perhaps comes closer to this analysis than to any other. This
is a basic area of the law of evidence in which courts and writers
do not agree and which appears to be undergoing a change. Traditionally, the statements of an agent or servant have been admitted (if at all) under one of two theories:
(1) as an act of an
authorized agent, or (2) as a spontaneous exclamation. Typically
if the first theory is used, it must be determined that the declarant was authorized to speak for the principal, and that a mere
servant as opposed to an agent is not thus authorized. 19 If the
spontaneous exclamation theory is used, admissibility is customarily limited to a statement made close enough to the time of
the occurrence described to exclude the inference that the statement was thought through. 20 Wider latitude is normally allowed,
timewise, for statements of servants that are against his apparent
interest or those of his master. 21 Courts are apt to use the phrase
"within the res gestae" or "not within the res gestae," sometimes
meaning no more than a spontaneous exclamation-that is, an
unthought immediate response to a shocking sight or to a thing
immediately being perceived-and sometimes meaning a part
of the transaction or occurrence necessary to round out the whole
22
picture.

Is McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE

19 Id. § 244.
20 Ibid.
21
22

Ibid.
Id. § 274.

§ 247 (1954).
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Some recent cases, including Tuller, have provided a much
broader base of admissibility for these statements.2 3 Neither relative immediacy in time, nor spontaneity, nor specific authorization
is required. In Martin v. Savage Truck Line, Inc. 24 and in Grayson v. Williams25 the courts relied on the premise that the statement was one which was made to an investigating officer, and
therefore, one which was somehow impliedly authorized because
it could have been foreseen. 26 Being against interest, it also had
the earmarks of reliability. To these arguments the court in Tuller added the idea that an official investigation (as opposed to
some chance discussion with an uninterested person) tends to supbort reliability, and the formal recording makes it more reliable
in the sense of accurate reporting at the trial-it is not necessary to have to rely on the witness's memory as to precisely what
was said. With all of these earmarks of reliability present in Tuller, the court held the statement "relating to his duties and acts
within the scope of his employment" admissible "since reliability
'27
is the basic test for the admission of any hearsay statement.
Tuller also referred to, but did not rely on, the much broader
rule of admissibility included in the Model Code of Evidence and
adopted in the Uniform Rules of Evidence. This rule would admit the statement of an agent or servant against his principal or
master "if the statement concerned a matter within the scope of
an agency or employment of the declarant for the party and was
made before the termination of such relationship." 28 Such a statement is not only adverse to the interest of the agent-servant-declarant in the sense that it might be used against him at trial,
but in the more immediate sense that it might result in his being
disciplined or fired for being incompetent or for talking out of
turn.

24

Shahid v. Gulf Power Co., 291 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1961); Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958).
121 F. Supp. 417 (D. Colo. 1954).

25

256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958).

26

In Tuller the court referred to this idea: "His explanation of his failure to do this [radio a distress signal] was within the scope of his
duties." 292 F.2d at 784.
292 F.2d at 784. The court also noted that defendant KLM also had
the opportunity to cross-examine the radio operator when the deposition was taken. Id. at 784.
MODEL CODE OF EviDEN E rule 508 (a) (1942). UmrFo~mI RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(9) (a). This rule was applied in Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. Rosenquist, 112 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1959), and followed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Shahid v. Gulf Power

23

27

28

Co., 291 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1961).
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As a matter of fact, both the Model Code of Evidence and the
Uniform Rules of Evidence go even further and provide for admissibility of such a statement where "one of the issues between the
(adverse) party and the proponent of the evidence of the statement is a legal liability of the declarant, and the statement tends
to establish that liability. '29 This rule was applied as an alternative basis of admissibility in Grayson v. Williams,"° and the reasons for it discussed at length, even though neither the Model
Code of Evidence nor the Uniform Rules of Evidence were cited
by the court.
This analysis would not be complete without reference to several other exceptions to the hearsay rule. The statement might
have been argued to be a simple declaration against interest, an
exception which disregards any relationship between the declarant and the parties to the law suit. The foundation requirements,
as stated by McCormick in his treatise 31 are: (1) that the declarant be unavailable at trial; (2) that the declaration be against
his pecuniary or proprietary interest, and (3) that the declarant
is speaking from personal knowledge. A fourth requirement often
32
added is that there be no apparent motive to falsify.
Numerical weight of authority does not support absence from
the jurisdiction as a ground of unavailability, nor does it support
admission of possible tort liability as being against pecuniary interest, although modern cases have held both sufficient to admit
evidence under the exception.3 3 The true test of reliability of
such a declaration should not be the mere fact of its being against
the declarant's interest, but rather his awareness of that fact. On
the other hand, there is much less need for a strong showing of
reliability where the declarant is available for cross-examination
and explanation. Certainly by modern case law, 34 the radio operator's statement might have been admitted under this exception,
35
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence also would admit it.
rule 508(c); U

29 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE

ONIom
RULE

OF EVIDENCE

63

(9)(c).
30 256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958).
31 McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE

§§

253-57 (1954).

32

5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1464 (3rd ed. 1940).

33

Jefferson, DeclarationsAgainst Interests, An Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1944). Pennsylvania Ry. v. Rochinski, 158
F.2d 325 (D.C.Cir. 1946).

34 Pennsylvania Ry.v.Rochinski, supra note 33; Neely v.Kansas City Pub.

Serv. Co., 252 S.W.2d 88 (Mo.1952); Weber v. Chicago, Rock Island &
P. Ry., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1915).
35 UNiFoRRo

RULE OF EVIDENCE 63 (10).

ADMISSIBILITY: PRIOR STATEMENTS OF WITNESS

605

It might also have been argued that this statement comes
within the exception for statements evidencing the state of mind
of the declarant. The usual situation involves a case in which the
state of mind of the declarant at the time the statement was made
is either in issue in the law suit (in terms of intent or knowledge),
or is relevant as showing the declarant's intent or knowledge from
which some future act may be inferred.3 6 The radio operator's
statement, of course, does not come within either of these situations since it looks backward. The only relevance that can be
argued for the statement is that it implies a particular state of
mind at a time prior to the statement-that is, a "reckless disregard of the consequences" of failing to report by radio the condition of the plane.
To admit this statement under such a theory clearly involves
most of the dangers of hearsay. To permit a proper evaluation
by the jury, if would be expected that opposing counsel might
want to test the radio operator's perception (did he really think
at all?), his memory (to what extent he rationalized his own conduct in his mind, or discussed it with others and hence been subject to suggestion?), his sincerity, and his communicative ability
(did he intend to suggest the inference for which plaintiff argues,
or did he rather intend something quite different?).
In will cases, where this theory is most often applied, the
death of the testator-declarant supplies a very strong necessity
and there may often be a complete lack of other significant evidence.3 7 On the other hand, there are other indicia of reliability
which the court in Tuller points out-the statement was made
at a formal proceeding, it was against interest, and it did not involve matters of opinion calling for careful cross-examination.
Moreover, its nearness in time to the fact reported makes the
probability of its accuracy substantially greater than formal testimony taken much later.38s It might also be pointed out that the
use of the statement in showing the radio operator's previous material state of mind would not be confused with its possible use
for any other nonpermissible purpose. That he actually did not
report was not apparently controverted.
The opinion in Tuller makes a passing reference to Pekelis v.
TWA 39 and the possibility of bringing this statement within the
§§ 268-71 (1954).
Id. § 270.
88 See McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 573, 577-78 (1947).
39 292 F.2d at 784.
36 McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE

37
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business entries exception to the hearsay rule. 40 Quite properly
the court refused to adopt this theory since it was not a report
to KLM. A more pertinent suggestion might have been the official records exception, 4 1 if the radio operator had been under a
statutory duty to file a specific report. 42 Courts have not, however, been ready to extend this exception very far in the area
of accident investigation.4" The exception makes no distinction
between reports which are against interest and those which are
for the interest of the reporter-historically the interest of the
public officer-reporter was neutral and the modern extension to
so-called ad hoc public officers, such as priests, physicians and
interests are neutral in
undertakers, also comprises persons whose
44
so far as any litigation is concerned.
In conclusion it should be pointed out that the hearsay rule,
as such, is usually justified on the ground that the declarant is
not available for cross-examination; exceptions are justified on
the ground that there is a real necessity for the use of such out-ofcourt statements and they were made under circumstances that
provide a probability of trustworthiness. If this probability is not
great, at least a court should be able to say that there is little
likelihood that the jury will be misled in its effort to evaluate a
statement's real worth. If, then, declarant is present and available for cross-examination, the objection that his prior statements
are hearsay loses much of its force. And this is the position taken
by the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 45 The fact that the prior
statement was not under oath can be clearly pointed out to the
jury and confrontation is preserved. The Uniform Rules of Evidence further provide that it shall not be per se objectionable to
impeach or support one's own witness, though the judge may require that the usual foundation be laid.4 6 The statement would
still be subject to the objection that it was unduly prejudicial or
opponent or necessitated an
confusing, unfairly surprising to 4the
7
undue consumption of trial time.
These provisions of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, however,
should not necessarily be judged solely with relation to the hear40

See

41

See Id. §§ 291-95.
Id. §§ 291-94.

42

43
44

45

McComvicK, EVIDENCE

§§ 281-90 (1954).

Wallace, Official Written Statements, 46 IowA L. REV. 256, 263-69 (1961).
Note, Admissibility of Statements by Ad Hoc Public Officials, 32 NEB.
L. REV. 469 (1953).
UNIFoRm RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(1).

46 UNiFoR1ii

RULES OF EVIDENCE

47 UximomW RULE OF EVIDENCE

20,

45.

22.
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say rule. If any prior statement of a witness is to be regularly
admitted, the pressure to secure such statements, which is now
substantial, will inevitably be increased. The trial will certainly
tend to be cluttered with prior statement after prior statement,
written and oral, drawn not with a view to preserving the memory of the witness or the lawyer but with a view to making the
best case before the jury or to presenting the jury with a written
brief. Perhaps this will not happen, but judges should be alert to
the full intention of Rule 45 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
Perhaps also, judicial discretion to exclude should be written into
48
Rule 20 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
The decision in Tuller does not go as far as the Uniform Rules
of Evidence-nor did it have to. It treated the statement as a
problem of hearsay alone, not as a prior statement of a witness,
and found sufficient reliability to avoid the exclusionary effect
of calling it by that name, although it did conclude with an oblique reference to the fact that defendant had had an opportunity
to cross-examine the radio operator when his deposition was taken.
It seems clear, however, that the opinion was intended to extend
the normal exceptions to the hearsay rule, to go beyond the old
cubbyholes. It is a welcome addition to the legal literature in
this complex area.

48 UNIFoIuv RULE OF EVIDENCE 20 reads as follows: "Subject to Rules 21
and 22, for the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a
witness, any party including the party calling him may examine him

and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him and
any other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility."

